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ABSTRACT  10 
Ecology’s reputation as a holistic and soft science is partly due to widespread misconceptions of its 11 
nature as well as shortcomings in its methodology. We show how the pursuit of empirical laws of 12 
ecology can foster the emergence of a more unified and predictive ecology based on complementary 13 
modes of explanation. Numerical analyses of population dynamics have a distinguished pedigree, 14 
spatial analyses successfully generate predictive laws for macroecology and physical analyses are 15 
tyically pursued by the ecosystem approach. The most characteristically ecological laws, however, 16 
are found in biotic analyses within the ‘functional trait’ paradigm. Holistic credentials for ecology 17 
may thus be restored on two bases: its accommodating complementary modes of analysis and 18 
explanation, and its having some laws within the least reductionistic mode consistent with its subject 19 
matter. These claims, grounded in the aspectual theory of Herman Dooyeweerd, lead to some 20 
suggestions for enhancing the versatility and usefulness of ecology – and other sciences – by 21 
balancing different research paradigms under a holistic vision. 22 
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 26 
Ecology, as the study of general patterns in the relationship of organisms to their environments, 27 
appears to be a holistic science. This notion is no doubt bolstered by its links to an ideology. What 28 
English-speakers call green is rendered in many other languages as ecological, which (also in English) 29 
evokes the ethic of conservation and certain kinds of nature-focused worldviews and lifestyles that 30 
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reject reductionistic explanations and technologies. But all kinds of scientific analysis proceed by 31 
reducing the full richness of reality as we experience it to simpler quantitative concepts, and 32 
corresponding data in which patterns may be discerned and explained. So in what ways might 33 
ecology as a science really be more holistic – or less reductionistic – than, say, physics? This paper 34 
begins from an interpretation of both physics and ecology as comprising various kinds of models 35 
based on entities and quantities abstracted from the world of human experience – including a 36 
special class of model known as scientific laws that describe measurable relationships among 37 
variables and can be used to make predictions. In view of the complexity and interconnectedness of 38 
living systems, some might then imagine that ecology’s subject matter prevents it from being as 39 
successful in this enterprise as the physical sciences, drawing attention to how few its laws are and 40 
how limited in scope and accuracy. Others, taking the view that laws of physics actually control the 41 
Universe, imagine that ecology’s laws could only be curious instantiations of these real causal laws 42 
of nature: useful approximations to unpalatable equations, perhaps, that may be convenient for 43 
certain applications. We dispute all this. The view advanced below recognises a range of 44 
complementary types of abstraction across the sciences and appreciates a wide diversity of valid 45 
modes of scientific analysis and explanation, while denying that scientific laws constitute causal 46 
explanations. This leads to a new view of how to assess the holism of ecology and other sciences, 47 
regardless of their subject matter or ideological associations. 48 
Law is a contested term with many connotations. The root meaning is probably a decree by 49 
which a governor regulates the way people go about their lives. When ‘laws of nature’ were 50 
conceived by early European natural philosophers such as Descartes and Boyle, the concept 51 
inherited much from the prominence of law in the Hebrew scriptures, where God is described as 52 
both making (e.g. Psalm 104, ESV) and respecting (e.g. Jeremiah 33:20, ESV) laws for the whole 53 
created order: inanimate, animate and human. With the advent of secularisation, the apparently 54 
inviolable nature of the laws for inanimate beings such as rocks and heavenly bodies (miracles aside) 55 
led some philosophers to the vision of discovering a set of true laws that would be equivalent to 56 
causes. However, that view largely gives way to a descriptive concept of scientific laws: the one 57 
often attributed to Isaac Newton. Newton’s mathematical descriptions of relationships among 58 
abstract quantities such as mass, force and velocity helped establish an empirical tradition of ‘laws 59 
of physics’ that need not be taken as causal explanations. Such laws were hypothesised, inferred 60 
(not deduced) and provisional. This is the basic sense in which we will use law (some readers might 61 
prefer regularity), and in the next section below we begin sketching a framework for some different 62 
classes of law, with examples from physics. Since ecology is very different from physics, the section 63 
then gives some introduction to ecology and why its laws might look different. 64 
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The central section of this paper then builds our framework more explicitly by exploring 65 
candidate ecological laws under four modes of analysis, according to the types of quantities they 66 
relate. Then in the following section a formal view of abstraction is laid out, drawing upon the 67 
framework of the Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd. Distinguishing abstraction from 68 
reductionism suggests new perspectives on the types of laws that may most fruitfully be sought in 69 
ecology. This leads on, in the final section, to some suggestions for the development of a truly 70 
holistic ecology.  71 
 72 
LAWS VIA ABSTRACTION IN PHYSICS AND ECOLOGY 73 
We begin by laying out a view of the relationships between laws and several other categories of 74 
‘model’ (Fig. 1). Scientific laws are often expressed as equations and so may be seen as a simple kind 75 
of mathematical model. They are often devised under the influence of conceptual models – such as 76 
the wave model of light, the organismic model of the plant community or the model of mutation and 77 
selection to explain evolution. We will return to conceptual models later, along with the notion of 78 
causal laws of nature. Mathematical models, meanwhile, may be classified into analytical and 79 
simulation models, each of which occupies a significant area of ecological research. Inferences may 80 
be deduced analytically or inferred from iterative simulations, by putting assumptions into 81 
mathematical forms and combining them. Dependence on multiple assumptions (Hall 1988), 82 
however, generally prevents such inferences from being taken as laws – rather as we distinguish 83 
Hubble’s Law (based on observations) from George Lemaître’s calculation of such a relationship 84 
(analytically modelled) on the basis of the theory of General Relativity and a model of cosmic 85 
inflation (Livio 2011). The challenge in demonstrating the scientific relevance of any kind of model 86 
lies in satisfying a scientific community that its assumptions are met in some situation of theoretical 87 
interest, and for a candidate law, this may generally be done by demonstrating that the relation 88 
holds for sets of empirical observations drawn from a sufficiently wide range of situations. The 89 
difficulty of achieving this in a world of complex interactions may explain why so much ecological 90 
work has been devoted instead to other kinds of modelling. In this paper, nevertheless, we focus on 91 
descriptive laws as one of the scientific elements that is easier to define and recognise. 92 
 93 
[Figure 1 about here] 94 
 95 
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A perspective on the development of physics out of natural philosophy, with the accompanying 96 
accumulation of proposed laws, will provide both background and contrast for our proposal for 97 
ecology. Danie Strauss (2010) provides an illuminating account of physics by focusing on levels of 98 
abstraction. The abstraction of numbers and numerical relations in the foundation of classical 99 
mathematics is an enduring legacy of ancient philosophy and arguably the ground of much 100 
subsequent success in the empirical sciences. Where observation-based theorising was pursued, 101 
however, inadequacies of this rational mode of explanation gave place to a spatial mode involving 102 
irrational numbers and geometric relations – as employed in classical astronomy, for example. That 103 
the laws of geometry are not now considered part of physics perhaps underscores the foundational 104 
significance of the novel modes of explanation that followed. Indeed, in much of Descartes’ natural 105 
philosophy the spatial mode remains predominant, and it is notable that the abstraction of space-106 
filling corpuscles serves as a model of the Universe. But Descartes also draws upon a clear concept of 107 
motion, and especially with the work of Galileo and Newton, a kinetic mode of explanation emerges 108 
as dynamic relations become a fundamental phenomenon, and laws were formulated describing 109 
trajectories, velocities and accelerations. Then, under the paradigm of thermodynamics, laws were 110 
formulated to describe the irreversible flows of heat and its interconversion with work, and energy 111 
came to be abstracted as a very general property of fluids and other bodies. Next, with quantum 112 
mechanics, electromagnetic radiation and subatomic particles come to be abstracted along with 113 
properties such as wavelength and spin, subject to laws of particle physics. Meanwhile Einstein’s 114 
work led to the abstraction of a mass–energy equivalence and the concept of spacetime, 115 
accompanying the laws of relativity.  116 
In this view, physicists have always observed the behaviour of non-living bodies, but abstraction 117 
at different levels has multiplied both the classes of entities and the number of quantities described 118 
by its expanding list of laws. Today’s physics student must learn to abstract such entities as bodies, 119 
subatomic particles and waves, and such quantities as momentum, charge, spin and spacetime. And 120 
whatever may be said about progress across paradigms, the laws of physics do mostly remain useful. 121 
For example, engineers may still make widespread use of Newton’s laws of motion when dealing 122 
with discrete bodies, and of thermodynamic laws when dealing with fluids.  123 
A scientific law, then, describes a quantitative relationship among certain abstract quantities 124 
that apply to a corresponding class(es) of ideal entity and that hold under given conditions (or with 125 
provisos). It should reliably provide both explanations and predictions. For ecology to adopt this 126 
definition, however, some details and potential objections need to be addressed. We will do this by 127 
considering each element of our definition in turn – and we hope, in the process, to absolve 128 
ourselves of the charge of ‘physics envy’ sometimes levelled at approaches like ours.  129 
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First, take the definition’s core: quantitative relationships among abstract quantities. It must be 130 
noted that ‘quantitative’ may include statements of equality or directed inequality among variables 131 
– as in the second law of thermodynamics. There are also what may be called meta-variables, which 132 
determine the meaning of other variables. Scale is perhaps the most important of these in ecology: 133 
the prevalence of heterogeneity and fluctuation means that quantities must usually be measured as 134 
an average over some region or time-period, and the value of the latter can greatly influence the 135 
measurement obtained. Accordingly, the set of candidate variables that may be combined in 136 
ecological laws is unlikely to be a limiting factor; conversely, the search for unifying theories looks 137 
tougher. 138 
Second, the classes of entity to which laws may pertain are if anything even more prolific in 139 
ecology, since biologists have expended considerable effort in classification projects. Species and 140 
organism are two particularly important general classes about which we will say more in the next 141 
section. Such classes may also be grouped in various hierarchies, from species up to kingdoms and 142 
from organisms up to ecosystems, items at various levels forming classes with their own properties. 143 
Moreover, ecologists may need to take into account the genetic diversity of individuals, seeing them 144 
as products of ontogenetic and phylogenetic histories. Mayr (1959) suggested that the uniqueness of 145 
ecology and evolution lies in their need for ‘population thinking’, i.e. considering differences among 146 
items – whether species or organisms – more than similarities. This variability is another reason why 147 
the choice of appropriate scales is important. It also calls attention to the fact that laws describe 148 
ideal entities. The entities described by laws of physics are such simple concepts as point charges, 149 
ideal gases and closed systems, which often appear good approximations to real things that 150 
physicists can observe; indeed electrons and other types of fundamental particles are observed so 151 
indirectly that they are simply assumed to be identical and ideal. But variation among individuals 152 
makes the subject-matter of biology difficult to idealise, and so less amenable to accurate 153 
description by laws. In summary, the multiplicity of ecological classes and the variability of entities 154 
within them calls for a very different approach from that of the physical sciences. Ecological laws 155 
may need to be less reductionistic in the sense of incorporating more information about individual 156 
differences. 157 
The final element of the definition to tackle is that of conditions and provisos. The celebrated 158 
universality of laws of physics is in fact qualified: while they may well be applicable in all parts of the 159 
Universe for all time, this comes at the expense of ceteris paribus assumptions that generally require 160 
conditions to be unrealistically monotonous (e.g. ‘if no other forces act’; ‘at constant 161 
temperature’)(Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003). But organisms evolve and function ecologically in 162 
intimate connection with particular environments, such that ceteris paribus clauses (‘all else being 163 
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equal’) can simply never be true: inumerable aspects of the environment may influence what is 164 
observed and their states cannot be fixed. We cannot, therefore, require that laws of ecology make 165 
very accurate predictions. Indeed, we may not even wish to imagine a biological experiment so well 166 
controlled that laws of biology would be accurate with good precision, for it might amount to killing 167 
the object of study, making biological laws irrelevant altogether. Cooper (2003, 113) suggested that 168 
an ecological law merely has to hold across a range of conditions large enough to be useful. Also, in 169 
view of ecology’s focus on natural kinds (e.g. alleles, species and communities), we may allow some 170 
of its laws to apply only to certain classes of entity. On the other hand, since natural kinds can be 171 
extremely diverse and are not held to be immutable, useful laws should apply to broad classes, such 172 
as the whole plant or animal kingdom on Earth, if not to all living things conceivable.  173 
Where provisos become prohibitively restrictive, an analytical shift is called for. One option is to 174 
look at different scales (Henle et al. 2014). Ecologists have always been constrained by logistical and 175 
computational limitations – but perhaps also beguiled by reductionist perspectives encouraging a 176 
focus on small areas and short time-horizons. Thus it took almost a century before individual 177 
behaviour was properly considered in studies of animal demographics, with a corresponding 178 
increase in study scales (Levin et al. 1997). Similarly, early work on ecological communities focused 179 
on fine scales now enlarged in the light of understanding gained from studying landscape and even 180 
continental scales, along with global samples of species (Lessard et al. 2012). Making observations or 181 
analyses at a broader scale can, by the law of averages, reduce the unexplained variability (random 182 
noise) in quantitative relationships that are simultaneously influenced by many other factors. 183 
Ecological research is painstakingly slow, and decades may have been lost under research focused on 184 
scales too small for proper recognition of the forces at play. Accounting for larger time-scales takes 185 
even longer, and the value of long-term experiments has been appreciated more slowly, for obvious 186 
reasons. Nature works at great scales, and so must we.  187 
Increasing scales alone, however, does not necessarily bring success (Botkin 1977).  The search 188 
for more general, resilient laws may be further aided by the use of different kinds of abstraction. 189 
Newtonian mechanics is not generally used to study the dynamics of fluids, nor electrostatic theory 190 
to explain chemical reactions. Such mismatches can occur in ecology, as we show in the next section.  191 
 192 
CONTEMPORARY ECOLOGICAL PARADIGMS AND THEIR LAWS 193 
Both practitioners (Lawton 1999; Murray 1992; Poulin 2007; Southwood 1980) and philosophers 194 
(Cooper 2003; Ulanowicz 2009) see a gulf between the reality of ecological science and the picture 195 
presented by 20th-century philosophers of science (often just philosophy of physics). They express 196 
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varying degrees of unease at the fact that regularities in ecology seem hard to come by, and any 197 
laws acknowledged appear to be contingent, limited in explanatory power and unable to predict 198 
accurately. Sharing the unease, we believe the poverty of laws is partly for the reasons outlined in 199 
the previous section. We also agree with Lawton (1991) that there is insufficient interaction among 200 
ecology’s major methodologies: arguably theoretical ecology has explored mathematical relations 201 
with limited opportunities to test their applicability to ecological systems, experimentation has been 202 
severely restricted in the spatial and temporal scales at which underlying processes are probed, and 203 
statistical ecology has been dominated by null-hypothesis tests designed to ask merely whether 204 
observed patterns are consistent with randomness or not. Some ecologists have launched profound 205 
critiques of the ways in which ecology is pursued as a science: both Peters (1991) and Murray (1992) 206 
complain of the failure to produce predictive laws. Perhaps our science is deemed holistic simply 207 
because it is messy! 208 
We believe there is more to ecology than has so far met the philosopher’s eye. Just as a suite of 209 
alternative modes of analysis and explanation has unfolded historically in the physical sciences and 210 
remains useful for various applications, so it appears that a similar suite is displayed 211 
contemporaneously in the diverse practices and theories comprising the science of ecology. This 212 
may be illustrated by describing a set of four distinct ecological modes of analysis that yield different 213 
types of laws and suggesting some of the outstanding candidates for laws of ecology that are 214 
proposed within each. We use the term paradigm here loosely and in the broad sense of a set of a 215 
set of examples, concepts and methodologies used by a community of researchers. We will say more 216 
about the corresponding modes of explanation later. 217 
 218 
The population paradigm 219 
Since early last century the population paradigm has built upon basic organismal biology – 220 
concerning species’ physiology and life-histories – with the study of population dynamics (Nicholson 221 
1933). This paradigm primarily focuses on the abundances of single biological species, or pairwise 222 
interactions between species. The individual is a fundamental concept in biology, but it is 223 
nevertheless an abstract class of entity (Fig. 2). Recognising individuals in practice is relatively 224 
straightforward in the case of most animals but often less so for plants, which may be clonal and 225 
spread vegetatively; a hint of reductionism may already be seen in abstracting individual grass plants 226 
from a meadow, for example. Then, given a method of enumerating individuals, population sizes can 227 
be abstracted by applying the biological species concept (Mayr 1942). This too may be fraught with 228 
conceptual challenges, but armed with a working definition and search-image of a species of 229 
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interest, an experienced ecologist can assess the numbers of individuals within a specified region 230 
(classically populations are considered as closed to migration). Dividing such counts by the area or 231 
volume of the region then yields population densities, which are the focal quantity in population-232 
ecology studies. Such densities may be compared over time or space and mathematically related to 233 
each other. 234 
The main universal law proposed in this paradigm is that of density-dependence. This states that 235 
in any given system (specified location and species), there is a density known as the carrying capacity 236 
above which populations tend to decline and below which they tend to increase. The determinants 237 
of this density, the rate at which it is approached and the nature of fluctuations around it are 238 
modelled in terms of density-dependent dynamics (Hixon, Pacala, and Sandin 2002), with empirical 239 
data being used to estimate free parameters for each of these details. When there are one or more 240 
parameters that must be estimated from data in any given situation, we may speak of a ‘weak law’, 241 
since it can only be used for making predictions once the parameter(s) are believed to be correct. A 242 
class of laws in this paradigm pertains to the prediction of carrying capacities in particular kinds of 243 
system (Peters 1991, 275). Arguments have raged from the 1940s (Nicholson 1954) and 1960s (den 244 
Boer 1968) through to the 21st century (Berryman 2002) about the true nature and role of density-245 
dependence in population ecology, but one of its defining assumptions is the ideal of the closed 246 
population.  247 
Other laws emerge from the idea of the metapopulation. Metapopulation models simulate how 248 
discrete patches of habitat alternate between being occupied and unoccupied by a species according 249 
to demographic stochasticity and migration rates between the patches (Harrison and Taylor 1997). It 250 
has been shown that long-term stability may pertain without assuming any form of density 251 
dependence: the mathematical definition of metapopulation capacity implies a law of persistence 252 
based on basic demographic properties (Hanski and Ovaskainen 2000). Such models are not 253 
explicitly spatial, although they are only realistic when assumed to describe population patches 254 
spread over much larger areas than those modelled using classical density-dependence. Indeed, 255 
ecology is replete with laws and phenomena that apply at particular ranges of scale (Levin 1992). 256 
The population paradigm can extend to a multi-species analogy. Scaling up from populations of 257 
individuals to populations of species, neutral community models consider speciation and extinction 258 
in place of birth and death. ‘Neutral’ here means that species are considered as equivalent to each 259 
other: individuals are ‘species-blind’, interacting with each other and their environment in the same 260 
way regardless of what species they belong to. An observer can distinguish them, and they 261 
reproduce after their own kind, but in simple neutral models there are no specific habitat 262 
preferences or competitive interactions. The unified neutral theory of biodiversity and biogeography 263 
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(Hubbell 2001) explores the statistical implications of assuming functional equivalence of all species 264 
in a community, giving predictions of relative abundance distributions for large numbers of 265 
anonymous species and their expected lifetimes.  266 
The population paradigm, in summary, considers abundances in fixed spatial regions, so that it 267 
can be seen as primarily numerical.  A classic statement of this paradigm is John Harper’s address to 268 
the British Ecological Society (1967): “A Darwinian Approach to Plant Ecology”. 269 
 270 
[Figure 2 about here] 271 
 272 
The macroecology paradigm 273 
What we call the macroecology paradigm is fundamentally geometrical. With roots going back nearly 274 
two centuries (Watson 1847), analyses of spatial patterns have gathered momentum in recent 275 
decades with advances in probability theory and computational possibilities (Smith et al. 2008). This 276 
paradigm typically focuses on the patterns of multiple species across large extents of space and 277 
sometimes time (Fig. 2). Important laws of the spatial-ecological paradigm relate numbers of 278 
individuals, of species and of endemic species to variable areas of observation – which may be 279 
isolated, contiguous or nested (Scheiner 2003). The theory of island biogeography (MacArthur and 280 
Wilson 1967), seminal in this paradigm, was largely heuristic: when the area of islands and the 281 
corresponding numbers of species found on them are both log-transformed, data points tended to 282 
cluster around a straight line. It has since been shown how species–area relationships for islands of 283 
varying area can be derived mathematically by combining the principles of random, distance-284 
dependent migration of individuals with demographic stochasticity (Hanski and Gyllenberg 1997), 285 
and how a range of relationships among numbers of species and areas in contiguous space arise 286 
from principles of local dispersal of distinct species (Chave and Leigh 2002).  287 
The macroecology paradigm has been highly successful in generating laws relating its own 288 
fundamental quantities to each other. While the laws are typically weak, having at least one free 289 
parameter to be tuned to fit empirical data, typical ranges of some parameters have been 290 
characterised, increasing the scope for making predictions. For example, species–area relationships 291 
typically follow a power-law with exponent between 0.15 and 0.4, for plants as well as animals – the 292 
lower end of this range being typical for islands, smaller organisms and higher latitudes (Drakare, 293 
Lennon, and Hillebrand 2006). A contemporary statement of the paradigm’s success may be seen in 294 
the celebration of unified theories of biodiversity (McGill 2010).  Here Brian McGill focuses on 295 
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mathematically unifying six theories that each ‘unify ideas of area, abundance and [species] 296 
richness’. But because the latter is commonly presented as ‘biodiversity’, the paper might be naively 297 
taken to present the unified theory of ecology! 298 
Despite its name and fanfare, we might after all question how far the macroecology paradigm is 299 
intrinsically ecological. Its focus on spatial and numerical abstraction (Caswell 1976) is such that its 300 
laws are not necessarily specific to living organisms: they might equally well describe spatial patterns 301 
of types of non-living artefacts, or in human cultural systems (e.g. Bentley, Hahn, and Shennan 2004) 302 
– and indeed a proportion of its significant papers are published in physics journals (e.g. Blythe and 303 
McKane 2007). While proponents of the paradigm may see this as a mark of success, this must be 304 
tempered by the limited kinds of quantities that can be predicted – which are mostly numerical and 305 
spatial. A similar charge may be laid to the population paradigm: its predictive quantities are 306 
essentially counts of things (individuals, species or occupied patches), and some of its laws might 307 
conceivably apply to non-biotic entities such as molecules in chemical reactions (e.g. Sadownik et al. 308 
2016). 309 
Thus the contrast between the population and macroecology paradigms should not be 310 
overplayed. They have in common a focus on the individual and its species identification, and many 311 
studies span both paradigms, as exemplified by the literature on spatial density-dependence (e.g. 312 
Gunton and Pöyry 2016) and spatial neutral models (Rosindell and Cornell 2007). We now turn to a 313 
pair of paradigms in which the species concept serves as no more than a tool. 314 
 315 
The ecosystemic paradigm 316 
The ecosystemic paradigm originates with the project by Tansley (1935) to use concepts from 317 
physics to understand ecological processes. As such, it defines the ecosystem to include non-living 318 
features along with the biotic. This abiotic environment is, of course, biotically referenced; it 319 
concerns those physical features that are known (or hypothesised) to affect living organisms, such as 320 
temperature, light and chemicals with which living tissues may interact. This paradigm can also 321 
absorb the ambiguity over whether morbose or detached tissues are living or not (Lindeman 1942). 322 
Integrating living and non-living elements for scientific analysis entails a focus on the highest 323 
common mode of functioning shared by these elements, which is physical. Thus quantities routinely 324 
abstracted in the ecosystemic paradigm include biomass, carbon pools, chemical concentrations, 325 
energy flux rates, evaporation rates and temperature.  Such quantities are attributed to ecosystems 326 
and specified compartments within them, although in practice this is often done by drawing upon 327 
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data attributed to individual organisms and species. The aim is to abstract to a level beyond the 328 
complexities of interactions between specific individuals in order to assess emergent behaviours and 329 
attributes. These typically include such complex concepts as net primary productivity, 330 
evapotranspiration, rates of nutrient cycling and food-web complexity.  331 
Candidate laws connecting ecosystem variables are not difficult to find insofar as empirical 332 
relationships are regularly quantified in ecosystem studies. Their predictive power is rarely 333 
impressive, however (Reichstein et al. 2014). The ecosystemic paradigm presents challenges for 334 
ecologists in search of laws more than any other paradigm: its variables are difficult to measure and 335 
highly sensitive to scale, its entities are difficult to observe and define, and the conditions that might 336 
need to be specified as provisos can rarely be controlled or found in steady states. Weak laws have, 337 
nevertheless, been formulated relating ecosystems’ productivity, disturbance and diversity, as well 338 
as relationships of these variables to soil nutrient concentrations and rainfall. Examples include 339 
resource response models such as the equations relating overall chlorophyll concentration, plankton 340 
biomass or primary productivity to the total phosphorus concentration of a lake (Table 10.1 in Peters 341 
1991), the intermediate disturbance hypothesis, which states that the species richness of a site will 342 
be maximised at intermeidate intensities of disturbance (Wilkinson 1999), and the productivity–fire 343 
relationship, stating that fire intensities are greatest at intermediate levels of habitat productivity 344 
(Reich et al. 2001). Such laws have mostly been arrived at heuristically, through empirical 345 
observation of variables of interest at a range of spatial and temporal scales, followed by statistical 346 
parameterisation.  347 
This paradigm offers great scope for selecting appropriate scales and levels of abstraction, and 348 
perhaps the best statement of its potential is made by Robert Ulanowicz (2009). 349 
 350 
The trait paradigm 351 
The paradigm of trait-based ecology has risen to prominence in the last few decades but sits in 352 
historic continuity with the wider science of biology. This paradigm concerns the abstraction of 353 
functional traits (Fig. 2): properties that may be measured across a wide taxonomic range of 354 
individuals, that may be standardised to some degree and that are hypothesised to relate to the 355 
survival and reproduction of the organism (McGill et al. 2006). They typically include standardised 356 
measurements of specified organs and their chemical composition. While such quantities may also 357 
feature in other paradigms, the trait-ecology paradigm is distinguished by its search for general 358 
principles or rules applying across many species (McGill et al. 2006). For example, comparisons of 359 
species’ trait attributes (specific values of traits) were central to the development of niche theory. 360 
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The competitive exclusion principle (Gause 1934) suggested that only one species could occupy a 361 
given niche, leading to the hypothesis of some degree of limiting similarity in the attributes of pairs 362 
of species that could coexist (den Boer 1986). There were attempts to quantify this limiting similarity 363 
(Rappoldt and Hogeweg 1980), but attempts to find a general law largely failed (Wilson, Gitay, and 364 
Agnew 1987). 365 
More successfully, various schemes have been proposed for relating the relative values of suites 366 
of functional traits to each other across different species and habitats. The idea of arranging species 367 
along a spectrum according to their tolerance of disturbance (MacArthur and Wilson 1967) was 368 
combined with the concept of adversity selection (Whittaker 1975) by Southwood (1977), who 369 
proposed a habitat-based ‘template’ for ecological communities defined by two fundamental axes: 370 
the predictability and the favourability of habitats (Greenslade 1983). The C-S-R theory of primary 371 
strategy types for plants (Grime 1974), and more ambitiously for living organisms in general (Grime 372 
and Pierce 2012), takes a similar approach but proposes three fundamental axes. Habitats conducive 373 
to vigorous competition are expected to exclude stress-adapted and short-lived species, while 374 
stressful and disturbed habitats support only stress-tolerant and ruderal species respectively. Here 375 
we notice the use of trait attributes to abstract functional types: analogues of biological species. An 376 
important step towards operationalising the C-S-R theory was provided by the discovery of the leaf 377 
economics spectrum (Wright et al. 2004), which appears to describe Grime’s competitor–stress-378 
tolerator axis for plants in terms of correlations among six leaf traits. Since the analysis by Wright et 379 
al. (2004) was based on a global dataset of higher plants from a wide range of habitat types, 380 
quantitative relationships it described may meet the requirement for universality of laws. Let us 381 
consider the relationship with the greatest degree of correlation as a test case. This relates 382 
logarithms (in base 10) of nitrogen to phosphorus concentrations in leaves (respectively N and P, 383 
both in %) as: log N = 0.83 + 0.66 log P – i.e. a 4.6-fold change in nitrogen concerntration per 10-fold 384 
increase in phosphorus, with covariance of 0.72. This indicates a non-linear relationship: the ratio of 385 
nitrogen to phosphorus concentrations increases with increasing nitrogen concentration. Earlier 386 
work had suggested that the ratio was typically around 10 (Garten 1976) and recognised effects of 387 
nutrient limitation, but that law can now be replaced by this more comprehensive one. Analogous 388 
laws have been proposed for various wood traits of woody plants (Chave et al. 2009), and there has 389 
been discussion of a more general ‘plant economics spectrum’ (Freschet et al. 2010).  390 
It is true that this statistical–empirical approach could be pursued to the point where a ‘law’ is 391 
discovered every time a statistical model is fitted to data from a broad enough data set (Peters 392 
1991), and some rates of decline in accuracy with increasing scope may be too precipitous to be 393 
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acceptable. The following is an example of a more theory-driven case – which also brings the 394 
possibility of pre-specifying the kinds of conditions in which a law should most clearly be observed. 395 
The fact that metabolic rates tend to scale as a function of body-size raised to the power of about 396 
three-quarters (B0.75), for of all kinds of organisms, had been known for a long time without a 397 
satisfying explanation (Feldman and McMahon 1983) until West, Brown, and Enquist (1997) 398 
published a metabolic scaling theory that explains this relationship in terms of the physics of fluid 399 
flow. Indeed, their theory also predicts observed body-size dependencies for rates of cellular 400 
metabolism, heartbeat and maximal population growth (all B-1/4), and time periods of blood 401 
circulation, embryonic growth and life-span (all B1/4) (West, Brown, and Enquist 1997). Various other 402 
physiological laws might also be cited here (Peters 1991, 281).  403 
As mentioned earlier, openness of paradigm boundaries means that some successful work 404 
straddles more than one paradigm. Laws for body-size–abundance distributions in animals 405 
(referenced in Peters and Raelson 1984), for example, combine a trait with a spatial quantity to 406 
achieve moderate predictive power with broad applicability. The trait paradigm, however, is 407 
particularly characteristic of ecology, and we suggest that its development will be crucial to the 408 
future of the science – not to mention its public appeal. There are many contemporary statements 409 
of its scope (Verberk, van Noordwijk, and Hildrew 2013; Winemiller et al. 2015). 410 
 411 
 412 
MODES OF ANALYSIS AND ASPECTS OF REALITY 413 
Our brief survey of four ecological paradigms (summarised in Table 1) reveals some fundamentally 414 
different concepts among them.  It also suggests that while laws have been proposed mostly in the 415 
population and macroecology paradigms, which are mathematically-oriented, there is great scope 416 
for general laws to be specified in the more ecologically oriented trait and ecosystemic paradigms. A 417 
quantitative study along these lines has in fact recently appeared: Linquist et al. (2016) analysed the 418 
prevalence of ‘resilient generalisations’ in ecology by comparing published meta-analyses 419 
concerning the three areas of population, community and ecosystem studies. Statistically-significant 420 
effects were registered in around 80% of the 187 meta-analyses used, and the finding that average 421 
sample sizes, numbers of taxa and numbers of biomes were broadly similar was taken to indicate 422 
comparable levels of generality for candidate laws in the three areas of ecology. Comparing actual 423 
degrees of scope and predictive accuracy among our different paradigms would be an illuminating 424 
exercise. 425 
 426 
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 [Table 1 about here] 427 
 428 
It may be asked why the four paradigms we have identified should be so significant. An answer 429 
may be given after synthesising a number of proposals made so far. We have suggested that 430 
scientific analyses depend upon abstracting classes of entities and quantitative properties from real-431 
world situations observed by scientists. We have affirmed the descriptive definition of scientific laws 432 
as resilient relationships among such quantities when predicated of ideal entities – whether they 433 
describe the numbers of fundamental particles in atoms or the density of individuals in types of 434 
habitat, the locations of planets or living organisms in 2- or 3- dimensional space, or the energy of 435 
fluids in containers or energy flow rates in ecosystems. Finally, we have suggested some distinct 436 
modes of analysis as a basis for distinguishing scientific paradigms. Our synthesis of these proposals 437 
draws upon the framework of the Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd, who suggested building 438 
a systematic understanding of reality upon the recognition of multiple fundamental nuclei for the 439 
human faculty of abstraction (Dooyeweerd 1953). Dooyeweerd’s list of modes began with the 440 
categories numerical, geometric, kinetic, physical, biotic and sensitive. For example, gathering data 441 
on tree seedlings in a forest, one might abstract the concepts of number in counting individuals, of 442 
height and location in measuring them, and of disease and death in examining their tissues. Asked 443 
what kind of variables were collected, we might summarise these respectively as numerical, spatial 444 
and biotic variables concerning the seedlings. This summary abstracts three broader categories, of 445 
the kind that Dooyeweerd termed ‘aspects’ of reality. 446 
According to Dooyeweerd, one cannot meaningfully abstract further to unify, say, the numerical 447 
and spatial aspects, the spatial and biotic, or all three. The intrinsically biotic properties of a situation 448 
cannot be explained by the spatial, for example, or vice-versa. Attempting to substitute any of these 449 
aspects for any other without loss of meaning is reductionistic in a way that Dooyeweerd showed to 450 
be experientially incoherent; such attempts deprive the concepts of their intuitive meanings 451 
(Dooyeweerd 1953). The existence of distinct kinds of laws for spatial, physical and biotic properties 452 
may also be suggested by the distinct natures of biology, physics and geometry; while each discipline 453 
in this list depends upon concepts drawn from the following ones, the converse is not true; 454 
moreover, these sciences tend to remain separate in the structures of academic institutions. The 455 
distinction of the aspects has been argued elsewhere (Strauss 2009); for present purposes we simply 456 
draw upon them heuristically. While debate over the legitimacy of various kinds of reductionism will 457 
continue, we may fruitfully continue exploring the diversity of modes of analysis across the science 458 
of ecology under the suspicion that they reflect distinct aspects of reality. 459 
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The mutual irreducibility of a set of modes of analysis suggests an explanation for the 460 
coexistence of such contrasting paradigms as we find in contemporary ecology. While the 461 
population-ecology paradigm assumes certain intrinsically-biotic concepts such as reproduction, 462 
maturity, death and competition, these are simply reduced to multiplicative coefficients in most 463 
work so that the main focus can be numerical. Accordingly, its laws and other outputs generally 464 
concern population sizes, structures and extinctions – outputs useful enough for purposes of 465 
population management, such as species conservation. Similarly, the macroecological paradigm is 466 
focused on spatial as well as numerical properties. Accordingly, geometrical patterns are what its 467 
laws can predict – and useful for biodiversity management. Indeed, this paradigm also seems to 468 
cover the temporal biodiversity patterns studied in paleoecology. The ecosystemic paradigm again 469 
involves biotic abstraction, but its focus is those physical quantities that can also capture dead and 470 
non-living components of a system. Its special concern with processes may also reveal a kinetic 471 
mode of analysis concerning fluxes, states and changes, which concepts Dooyeweerd attributed to a 472 
distinct ‘kinematic’ aspect of reality. The outputs of the ecosystemic paradigm can be useful for 473 
management of land and water bodies as well as the increasing challenge to manage global climate. 474 
The trait paradigm, finally, is directly focused on biotic phenomena. It seeks laws to describe biotic 475 
functions occurring within and between organisms, and its outputs should be useful for such diverse 476 
interests as the improvement of agricultural cultivars, understanding of invasive species’ behaviour 477 
and biological impacts of extinctions. Like the other paradigms, it has its blind-spots and may be 478 
combined with different paradigms for certain purposes. In summary, each paradigm answers 479 
certain kinds of questions and has different contributions to make in the application of ecological 480 
science to the challenges identified by society. 481 
The postulate of distinct kinds of abstraction may also suggest an evaluation of the history of 482 
particular sciences and hypotheses for future work.The account of physics with which we started 483 
portrays progression along Dooyeweerd’s sequence of modes of abstraction, and leaves open the 484 
possibility that there might even be further aspects of reality to disclose in the study of non-living 485 
things (the framework was expected to be developed and refined: Dooyeweerd 1953, vii) – a 486 
question that we must leave to philosophers more active within that field. The ecological story is not 487 
so evidently progressive; indeed its notable abandoned paradigm – the organismic model of 488 
communities – is decidedly biotic in emphasis (Clements 1916, cited in Keller and Golley 2000), and 489 
it seems unlikely that the population, macroecology and ecosystemic paradigms will come to be 490 
seen as precursors to the functional trait paradigm. Instead, one might see the coexistence of 491 
paradigms as a healthy part of such a holistic science. After all, it is clear that earlier paradigms of 492 
the physical sciences are by no means dead, and that many scientific laws have enduring validity. 493 
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Ecology might be so much the richer for its privileged position, able to draw upon a range of modes 494 
of abstraction. Here, following Dooyeweerd’s sequence on to the sensitive aspect, we should also 495 
mention the science of behavioural ecology as a paradigm partly focused on the sensitive 496 
perceptions of animals.  497 
To draw together the challenges of prediction and explanation, the meaning of ‘reductionism’ 498 
should be clarified. ‘Reduction’ is sometimes used to mean what should be called abstraction. 499 
Abstraction is surely an essential – even foundational – component of the sciences, whereas 500 
reductionism tends to imply a simplistic notion of causation (Levins and Lewontin 1980). 501 
‘Reductionism’ thus remains problematic for the reasons given above, as reflected in the term 502 
‘greedy reductionism’ [Watts & Reiss, this issue], and we suggest that recognising a legitimate 503 
plurality of modes of analysis in ecology should guard against this.  But we can also take modes of 504 
analysis to provide modes of explanation, as suggested by Strauss (2009, 402-416). A brief look at 505 
ecological modes of explanation will help conclude our survey. That is, how do scientific laws relate 506 
to conceptual models?  507 
Likening a complex situation to something more familiar is the basis of many a scientific 508 
explanation, as suggested by the predominance of metaphors in scientific terminology. Ecology is 509 
replete with these: populations and their carrying capacities; communities, assemblages and 510 
systems; competition, stress and disturbance; and traits and their filters are just some prominent 511 
examples. The analogies behind these metaphors sometimes suggest causal analogues that may be 512 
influential in theorising about a topic. Carrying capacities suggest volumes of containers that can 513 
hold certain numbers of items and spill if over-filled – and so the law of density-dependence may 514 
gain a mechanical connotation that seems, to most ecologists (let alone laypersons), to provide a 515 
more compelling causal analogue than any notion of causation acquired from watching the births, 516 
struggles and deaths of moths or fruit flies in jars of medium. Trait filters suggest a sieving process 517 
(sometimes directly illustrated – e.g. Keddy 1992) in which certain trait values are admitted to a 518 
collection while others are excluded – and so laws of community composition similarly gain a 519 
mechanical connotation that provides a compelling causal analogue. Indeed, most of the above 520 
metaphors concern mechanical analogies, which prompts the question whether ecologists’ 521 
conceptual models are predominantly physical (competition may be the exception in the above list) 522 
– and if so, why. A detailed study of the diversity of conceptual models in ecology and their 523 
relationships to ecological laws would no doubt be illuminating. For now, we may surmise that the 524 
predominance of mechanical metaphors and imagery in conceptual models makes up for the 525 
relatively small contribution of the physical (ecosystemic) paradigm to ecology’s laws. Thus, as 526 
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modes of explanation, the paradigms must complement to each other if one is not to displace the 527 
others. 528 
 529 
A TRULY HOLISTIC ECOLOGY 530 
Contemporary ecological science employs a range of levels of abstraction – manifested in both its 531 
analytical laws and its conceptual models – and analyses phenomena at a range of scales. Our vision 532 
for ecology as a holistic science, then, may be grounded in three features. First, ecology gradually 533 
refines its focus to appropriately-broad spatial and temporal scales of analysis within each of its 534 
paradigms. This is perhaps comparable with the inclusion into physics of such concepts as action at a 535 
distance and statistical mechanics. Second, a portion of its theory (and laws) is based on abstractions 536 
that can only be made of living things. This means not only abstraction of biological classes (common 537 
to all the paradigms), but also of essentially biological quantities such as demographic rates, 538 
speciation rates and trait values. More generally, we might say that ecology sometimes employs the 539 
least reductionistic mode of analysis consistent with its subject matter – and in this sense 540 
contemporary physics, with its understanding of energy, is also more holistic than Newtonian 541 
physics. Thirdly, it is significant that ecology accommodates a range of complementary modes of 542 
analysis, focusing on what may be conceived of as the numerical, spatial and physical aspects of 543 
reality as well as the biotic. It has been claimed that community ecology could be logically and 544 
mathematically reduced to population ecology, and that in turn to ‘individual ecology’ (Schoener 545 
1986), and this may be plausible within areas of those three programmes concerned with 546 
abstraction at the ‘mechanistic’ (physical?) level; indeed the claim appears trivial if considered 547 
merely at the spatial level (since the macroecology paradigm can well work with neutral species). 548 
But a claim that the trait, ecosystemic, spatial and population paradigms might be mutually 549 
reducible cannot even be entertained, we suggest, without denying the fundamental concepts of 550 
organisms, flows, patterns and counts as we intuit them. These concepts are not differentiated 551 
simply by scaling, as sometimes claimed; they are logically incommensurable (Clouser 2005, 192f). 552 
This view of ecology’s holism may now suggest some ways in which the versatility and usefulness of 553 
the science may be enhanced by balancing different research paradigms under such a vision. 554 
Our view may be summarised by three distinctive proposals. Firstly, ecology can and should have 555 
its own laws, and these may be discovered quite heuristically. Quantitative relationships among 556 
variables abstracted at appropriate levels and measured at appropriate scales are legitimate 557 
candidates for laws of ecology, and the community will determine which ones are sufficiently robust 558 
to be accepted as such. Secondly, our four modes of ecology offer a robust alternative to the typical 559 
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major divisions of ecology textbooks. Textbooks commonly distinguish population, community and 560 
ecosystem ecology, treating macroecology (if at all) with evolution and trait ecology rather 561 
haphazardly; one of the most popular textbooks reveals a particularly individual-focused emphasis in 562 
its tripartite division into “Organisms”, “Species interactions” and “Communities and Ecosystems” 563 
(Begon, Townsend, and Harper 2006). Thirdly, our view supports broader philosophical challenges 564 
against both reductive physicalism and holistic vitalism. The notion of physical mechanisms being the 565 
ultimate model of causation leaves ecology as a peripheral and inescapably complicated science 566 
(Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003) where chance often has to be invoked as a pseudo-cause (Ulanowicz 567 
2009). Vitalism (or idealist holism: Levins and Lewontin 1980), by contrast, tends to advance non-568 
deterministic explanations – as in the organismic view of plant communities (Clements 1916, cited in 569 
Keller and Golley 2000). Our view, while agnostic about the locus of causation, expects a wide range 570 
of ecological phenomena to be broadly predictable under suitable analyses. 571 
We end, then, with a plea for pluralism. Ecologists should celebrate the diversity of paradigms 572 
that make up our science and recognise that progress in theoretical and applied ecology will be 573 
enhanced by the use of modes of analysis appropriate for the applications envisaged. In particular 574 
we suggest that there will be room for strong laws and unifying theories in each of the main 575 
paradigms of ecology. Educators, meanwhile, might emphasise to students the distinctly biotic 576 
paradigm of trait ecology, perhaps even as their primary introduction to the science before 577 
numerical, spatial and physical paradigms. Finally, we hope that philosophers of science will 578 
recognise the diverse set of modes through which a holistic notion of causation may be refracted to 579 
yield complementary causal accounts, none of which is ontologically privileged – although some will 580 
invariably be more useful than others in any given situation. Further work on concepts of causation 581 
in ecology is called for (Bateson and Laland 2013). 582 
If the proposal made here proves useful in the science of ecology, investigation along similar 583 
lines in the human sciences might uncover yet richer arrays of paradigms in holistic 584 
complementarity. In psychology, the longstanding opposition between unimodal and bimodal 585 
interpretations of the human mind might be overtaken by views recognising the complementarity of 586 
three or more modes for conceptualising and analysing the phenomena of human experience [REF?]. 587 
In the social sciences Dooyeweerd recognised the value of historic and linguistic aspects alongside a 588 
truly social one (Dooyeweerd 1953), and this scheme further recognises distinct economic, aesthetic 589 
and juridical aspects as being invoked in appropriate fields of scholarship. 590 
 591 
 592 
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Table 1: Focal concepts and topics of the four ecological paradigms outlined in this article. Note that 598 
this set of paradigms is not intended to be exhaustive but simply to illustrate some alternative 599 
approaches to scientific abstraction in ecology. 600 
 Population Macroecology Ecosystemic Trait 
Approximate 
synonyms: 
Autecology; Species 
ecology 
Neutral /near-
neutral ecology 
Process ecology Comparative 
ecology; Synecology 
Focal 
abstractions: 
Population + 
Species 
Spatial pattern + 
Species 
Process + 
Community 
Functional trait + 
Individual 
Other fundam-
ental concepts: 
Life-cycle Habitat patch Resource fluxes Niche; Functional 
type 
Typical laws: Density-
dependence 
Species–area 
relationships 
Productivity 
relationships 
Trait relationships 
Fundamental 
questions: 
Are population 
densities regulated? 
What is the unified 
theory of 
biodiversity? 
How do ecosystems 
interact with their 
environment? 
How do different 
species coexist?  Are 
there real types of 
communities? 
Typical 
application: 
Will this species 
survive in this 
region? 
How many species 
will be found in this 
region? 
How stable is this 
ecosystem? 
Which species will 
be found in this 
community? 
Aspect of 
analysis: 
Numerical Spatial Physical Biotic 
 601 
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 764 
Figure 1. A conceptual map to situate scientific laws among a range of other concepts discussed in 765 
the text. These are ordered from the more specific (left) to the more general (right), and from the 766 
more complex (bottom) to the simpler (top). The contact and overlap among the ellipses are 767 
intended to suggest, respectively, degrees of conceptual proximity and semantic overlap. The 768 
italicised words in each ellipse comprise a set of examples taken from evolutionary ecology. 769 
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 772 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of modes of analysis employed in various ecological paradigms. 773 
The grey cloud represents the world of experience. The ellipses represent classes of entities 774 
abstracted from experience, while the boxes represent kinds of quantities abstracted, to which laws 775 
may apply. Arrows point from quantities or entities to others that they help to define. The four 776 
paradigms corresponding to the four focal quantities are given in upper-case letters adjacent to the 777 
relevant boxes. 778 
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